This paper analyses the impact of opening clauses in German collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) on job flows. Opening clauses should provide firms with more flexibility in economic crises. Therefore, firms operating under a CBA with opening clauses are expected to have lower job turnover, in particular lower job destruction under bad business conditions, and -if job creation is not adversely affected -higher job growth. We analyse this question empirically using data from the IAB Establishment Panel, a large and representative data set on German establishments. We supplement the data with additional information on the existence of opening clauses in CBAs in the West German manufacturing sector (using the IAW Data Set on Opening Clauses). By means of a matching approach, we address selection problems in flexible CBAs and reveal that the existence of opening clauses has a positive, albeit not always significant, effect on job growth. In contrast, there are no significant effects on job destruction and job creation per se, and, based on information given in the IAB Establishment Panel itself, explicit knowledge of opening clauses or their application have no additional effect on job flows.(JEL: J51; J63; C21.
Introduction
During the recent recession, the German labour market seems to have performed relatively well. Nonetheless, a number of economists and politicians are still discussing the rigid institutional setting of the German labour market (OECD 2009) . In fact, industry-level collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) still dominate the German bargaining system (ELLGUTH and KOHAUT 2010) and although many establishments have abandoned CBAs and collective coverage the share of employees covered by collective bargaining, has dropped sharply, particularly since the 1990s (ADDISON et al. 2011) . To counter this development, among other measures, opening clauses have been introduced in an attempt to enable more flexibility within CBAs and thereby offset the decline in coverage. It is therefore a pertinent question to study the relationship between opening clauses and employment in collectively covered firms to gain insight into whether the change towards more flexibility in bargaining institutions can be successful.
In the literature on industrial relations, CBAs have been blamed for decreasing of employment since the seminal contributions of OSWALD (1982) and CALMFORS and DRIFFILL (1988) . The main critique of CBAs is directed towards theirinflexibility and the establishment of a wage floor (see KOHAUT and SCHNABEL 2003) . Indeed, FIT-ZENBERGER et al. (2012) and ANTONCZYK (2011) have recently shown that collective coverage tends to increase wages and tendsto decrease the wage dispersion, and that this effect increases with net union density, i.e. more powerful unions. However, during recent decades, the government and the bargaining partners in Germany, that is unions and employers' associations, have addressed the economic critique by introducing or expanding various measures of decentralisation and flexibility. These include, for example, company-level pacts for employment (Betriebliche Bündnisse), temporary work agencies (Leiharbeit), and short-time work (Kurzarbeit); see, for example, ANTONI and JAHN (2009 ), ELLGUTH and KOHAUT 2009 and MÖLLER (2010 . We turn to one of these measures, which has, so far, not been analysed in detail, namely opening clauses, 1 and investigate empirically the relationship between such clauses andemployment, i.e. labour demand, in German firms. Additionally, as opening clauses have been primarily introduced by the social partners to prevent job losses in economic downturns, we analyse whether they primarily affect job destruction, that is, whether they work as intended, or if there are other (side) effects. Therefore, we use the concept of job flows as introduced by, for example, DAVIS et al. (1996) . Job flows focus on the dynamic side of labour demand, acknowledging the simultaneity of large-scale continual job creation and job destruction. While the impact of CBAs per se on job flows has been analysed before in the so-called union employment litera-ture, 2 this is, to our knowledge, the first paper to analyse the impact of opening clauses on job flows.
Opening clauses allow firms to adjust their employees' wages and working time in the event of negative shocks, something which is usually not allowed due to the fact that collectively bargained working conditions feature a minimum standard that cannot be eluded. A study of German firms by FRANZ and PFEIFFER (2003) detects that CBAs are among the most important reasons for wage rigidities. This study also analyses opening clauses as a remedy for inflexibility and states that firms seldom make use of them. However, newer evidence by KOHAUT and SCHNABEL (2007) finds that most firms know about opening clauses and a large fraction of them also use them. The existence of opening clauses can have varying effects on job flows. As intended, firms with opening clauses can apply them during adverse business conditions. This should lower their rate of job destruction, because they can adjust labour costs through lower wages (or shorter working hours) and keep a larger number of employees. In fact, the effect of opening clauses on wages has recently been analysed by ELLGUTH et al. (2012) . They find wage cuts due to the application of opening clauses of about 11%. Additionally, GARLOFF and GÜRTZGEN (2012) find that, in below-average-performing firms, wages are found to be more responsive to local profits when opening clauses exist. However, this might result in a lower rate of job creation if the economic situation improves, because instead of hiring new employees, firms have to re-expand working hours first, or workers demand compensation for their wage losses, whicht prevents new hiring. The overall effect on job growth is ex-ante ambiguous, while job reallocation should be lower. Only if we assume the effects of lower job turnover on overall job growth to be positive, for example because of longrun effects from increased human capital accumulation or better job matching quality, then there will be a positve effect on employment. An additional effect could occur for firms that explicitly know about the possibility of applying opening clauses because they may anticipate the increased flexibility pictured above. These firms could hire more employees during good business conditions, knowing they can lower labour costs via opening clauses if the economic situation worsens. We would then observe a higher rate of job creation for firms that explicitly know about opening clauses, and probably also a higher rate of job reallocation, and of job growth. However, ELLGUTH et al. (2012) and also GARLOFF and GÜRTZGEN (2012) find an anticipation or threat effect on wages. The former find that the existence of opening clauses is related to higher wages by about 11%, such that this would prevent firms from hiring excess labour known as labour hoarding. We do not model wages in detail Opening Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements 161 -------------2 WOODEN and HAWKE (2000) analyse this for Australia; LONG (1993) and WALSWORTH (2010) for Canada; ADDISON and BELFIELD (2004) , BLANCHFLOWER et al. (1991) , BRYSON (2004) and MACHIN and WADHWANI (1991) for Britain; BRONARS et al. (1994) and LEONHARD (1992) for the United States. Most studies suggest a negative impact of 3% lower job growth per year. The German literature has so far been restricted to wage effects, for example BURDA et al. (2008) , FITZENBERGER et al. (2012) and STEPHAN and GERLACH (2005) , or to the effects of works councils on job flows; see TEIXEIRA (2006) or JIRJAHN (2008). here, as there is only information on the total wage sum of a firm in our data and this has been analysed in the literature before. 3 We test these theoretical considerations using data from the Establishment Panel of the Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung, IAB). We combine this data set with a survey by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, IAW) on opening clauses in CBAs in the manufacturing sector in West Germany (IAW Data Set on Opening Clauses). We address the problem of selectivity by using a matching approach to control for selection bias due to observed firm heterogeneity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 will shortly summarise the institutional setting of the German system of industrial relations with a focus on opening clauses. In chapter 3 we will present our data and econometric model. Chapter 4 presents the results together with some robustness checks, while chapter 5 concludes.
Institutional Background
As the German system of industrial relations differs to some extent from that of other developed countries, we will briefly describe the institutional environment in which our empirical investigation takes place. In large areas of the German labour market, particularly in manufacturing, labour relations rest on two pillars: regional, industry-wide CBAs (Flächentarifverträge) between trade unions and the respective employers' associations, and co-determination inside firms between works councils and management.
Collective contracts are based on the Collective Bargaining Agreement Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz, TVG), which regulates the content, conclusion and termination of labour contracts, which are legally binding for all union members, but generally extended to all employees in firms that have signed a CBA. Since working conditions negotiated in collective contracts serve as minimum standards, firms can always choose to deviate from these contracts in favour of employees, but not at their expense (Günstigkeitsprinzip). 4 Additionally, German legislation also prohibits plantspecific agreements between work councils and management to avoid the minimum standards of collective agreements. However, the social partners have started to bypass these regulations by allowing the creation of so-called company-level pacts for employment. A number of studies have analysed their existence, determinants, and Tobias Brändle and Wolf Dieter Heinbach
According to cFitzenberger and FRANZ (1999) , the introduction of opening clauses initially increases wages in collectively covered firms, because unions demand compensation for the increased flexibility. However, this wage level effect does not seem to playa major role here, because the majority of opening clauses were introduced before the timespan of our data (HEINBACH and SCHRÖPFER 2007). effects. While the concessions made by both parties can be considerable, the creation of these pacts is limited to situations where a significant number of jobs are at risk. However, even after controlling for endogeneity, their existence still tends to correlate negatively with employment growth (see BELLMANN et al. (2009) and the sources cited therein).
The flexibility of collective contracts is especially important, because firms are free to choose whether they want to become a member of an employers' association, bargain at the firm level, or with each individual worker separately. However, once they choose to bargain collectively § § 3 and 4 TVG regulate the termination of CBAs by establishing strict after-effect clauses (Nachwirkungsprinzip), such that leaving collective coverage seems not to be a viable option for more flexibility in the short run (TRAXLER et al. 2001) . Therefore, the social partners have started to introduce the option for firms to bypass the minimum standards set by CBAs in bad economic circumstances through opening clauses. When forming part of a CBA ( § 4 TVG), they specify when and to what extent firms are allowed to lower wages or working conditions below the normally binding standards (KOHAUT and SCHNABEL 2007) . They are typically restricted in terms of magnitude and time, and they rely on the agreement of the union responsible, the works council, or the employees. Additionally, firms sometimes need to prove that job losses can be prevented through the adoption of hardship clauses. HEINBACH (2007) systematically records data on opening clauses in CBAs in West German manufacturing and concludes that, contrary to employment pacts, opening clauses exist for the majority of CBAs. HEINBACH and SCHRÖPFER (2007) additionally find that opening clauses are highly heterogeneous intheir contents and application. To make opening clauses more operable, they distinguish three types: opening clauses on working time, opening clauses on compensation, and other, more firm-specific, opening clauses. While opening clauses on working time were dominant until the mid-1990s, opening clauses on compensation have been introduced into most CBAs since then.
Data and Econometric Model

Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the IAB Establishment Panel (IAB EP). The IAB has conducted this survey each year since 1993 for West Germany and since 1996 for East Germany in personal interviews with higher management staff. The IAB EP is a representative sample of all establishments 5 in Germany with at least one employee covered by social insurance, and contains about 7% of all German employees. It is stratified randomly across industries and firm size classes and comprises up to 16,000 firms per year. There is information on firm characteristics, such Opening Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements
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-------------as size, turnover, ownership, investment volume, number of jobs and economic prospects; as well as on labour market institutions, such as collective agreements, works councils, government subsidies, and active labour market policies. For more information, see the IAB website (www.iab.de) or FISCHER et al. (2009) . We are able to make use of this data set through controlled remote data access via the research data center (Forschungsdatenzentrum, FDZ).
In the panel version of the survey, the IAB corrects for panel attrition and panel mortality by adding firms that match lost observations in terms of their representativeness. However, to compute job flows, we can make use of the fact that for each firm we observe both the current number of jobs and last year's. We can therefore use the cross-section version of the survey (and increase the number of observations). As the IAB EP measures the numbers of jobs in each firm on June 30th of each year, we can observe only job flows that happen between the years (net job flows). We follow DAVIS and HALTIWANGER (1992) in computing (net) job growth rates, jgr, as the difference in the number of jobs in years t and t À 1, divided by the averagenumber of jobs for each establishment j:
where x jt and x jtÀ1 represent the number of jobs in the respective year. Accordingly, we compute job creation, jcr, job destruction, jdr, and job reallocation rates, jrr, as the positive or negative part, or as the absolute value of the difference in the number of jobs, respectively.
In our study we use waves 2000 to 2007 of the survey. In addition to a standard annual cohort of questions, there are varying topics of interest not covered every year. In waves 2005 and 2007, the IAB EP also covers questions on opening clauses. Firms respond whether they know if opening clauses exist in their CBA, whether they use such clauses, and which type of opening clause they use. In addition to being available for only two years, KOHAUT and SCHNABEL (2007) find that a significantnumber of firms do not know if opening clauses are actually a feature of their CBA.
We supplement the information on opening clauses from the IAB EP with additional region-specific and industry-specific information gathered from a national archive on CBAs (Tarifregister). From the Tarifregister, we know for each CBA in the West German manufacturing sector whether opening clauses exist, which types of opening clauses exist, and in which year the opening clauses were introduced. For an overview of this survey, the IAW Data Set on Opening Clauses, see HEINBACH (2007) . 6 The timespan of the IAW data is in fact the reason why we use the waves 2000-2007 of the IAB EP. For the analysis here, we distinguish between two different categories: 'no opening clauses' and 'opening clauses on working time and compensation'. To be able to match the data with the IAB EP, we use the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES), an official source of statistics on firms from the Tobias Brändle and Wolf Dieter Heinbach
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-------------manufacturing and service sector in Germany, to aggregate the information at the regional and industry levels. From the GSES we know which particular CBA is applied in a specific firm, 7 and therefore whether a firm uses opening clauses. We then generate employment weights for the different CBA areas and classify each area into one of the two categories of opening clauses, depending on whether the majority of employees in collectively covered firms in this CBA area are covered by CBAs with or without opening clauses. 8 We match the additional information to the IAB EP in a such way that each firm in the IAB EP is classified into one of two categories, depending on its regional location and industry affiliation. 9 We restrict our sample to firms covered by a collective bargaining agreement (dropping firms with individual and firm-level collective bargaining agreements) with at least five full-time employees. We also drop observations with missing covariates and are left with a sample of 13,165 (2,486) collectively covered firms in the West German manufacturing sector over the entire period (in 2005 and 2007 ).
10 Table 1 shows the prevalence of opening clauses among collectively covered West German manufacturing firms and the job flow rates for the different groups of firms with respect to opening clauses. As regards the prevalence of opening clauses, we find that the majority of firms, 65%, are covered by a CBA with opening clauses on working time and compensation (flexible CBA). The share of firms covered by a flexible CBA rises during our period of interest from 52% in 2000 to 71% in 2006. So, while the majority of firms could already use opening clauses at the beginning of the decade, this share subsequently rises to almost three in four firms and seems to be stable during the final years of our sample. Turning to the IAB EP data, although it is available only for the years 2005 and 2007, we can gather additional information on whether firms actually know about the existence of opening clauses in their CBAs and whether they use them. The middle part of Table 1 shows that the majority of firms, 84%, claim to be informed about opening clauses, while only a small fraction of firms, 16%, say the opposite. Contrary to the IAW information, among firms that know whether or not there are opening clauses in their CBAs, only a minority, (42% or 36% of total firms) state that opening clauses exist, while the majority say there are none (see also KOHAUT and SCHNABEL (2007) for further analyses of the IAB EP data). This striking difference in findings, with official information on CBAs asserting that the majority of firms should be able to use opening clauses, while firm surveys suggest that a much smaller fraction know about them, has already been addressed by Opening Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements
We do not know this for the firms in the IAB EP. In fact, we use a conservativemeasure and classify a CBA area as belonging to the second category only if at least 80% of the covered firms are covered by CBAs with opening clauses.
9
Further information on this procedure is laid out in HEINBACH and SCHRÖPFER (2008) . For example, industry classification and regionsin the EP do not perfectly overlap with collective bargaining areas. HEINBACH and SCHRÖPFER (2008) . We try to explain the gap in knowledge by looking at the fraction of firms that actually apply opening clauses (lower part of Table 1 ). Out of those firms which state that they know opening clauses exist in their CBAs, a large share, 47%, do indeed use them. Hence, most firms seem to be uninformed about opening clauses until they are in a position where they might be forced to use them.
11
When looking at job flows, we see that firms with flexible CBAs, according to the IAW-classification, have lower job reallocation rates, and both lower job creation and job destruction rates. However, job growth rates do not differ significantly. Using the IAB information, we compare the job flow rates between firms with or without explicit knowledge about opening clauses in their CBAs. Again, job reallocation and job destruction rates are lower for firms with opening clauses, while job creation rates areabout the same. Therefore, firms with opening clauses have higher job growth rates; they grow by about 1.7% a year, while firms without opening clauses shrink by -
------------
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A similar argument is put forward by FRANZ and PFEIFFER (2003) , who claim that firms differ in the way they set wages and hence in their need for flexibility. Therefore, firms with less need for flexibility have no incentives to inform themselves about the flexibility of labour market institutions.
about 0.8% a year, on average. This could indicate that opening clauses do indeed increaseemployment through a reduction in lay-offs, but also that firms with explicit knowledge of opening clauses do not anticipate their increased flexibility, as they do not create more jobs. Contrary to this, firms that do not know about opening clauses at all have even higher job growth rates of about 3.0% per year, caused by very high job creation and relatively low job destruction rates. As mentioned above, these firms do not feel the need to inform themselves about measures of crisis, such as opening clauses, probably because they are currently in a good business situation. However, among firms that say they have access to opening clauses, those that actually apply them have lower job reallocation and job creation rates, while job destruction rates are about the same compared to firms that know about opening clauses, but do not apply them. Hence, firms applying opening clauses, which are probably firms in crisis, have lower job growth rates, namely of 1.0% compared to 2.4% for firms not applying them. Descriptive statistics, however, cannot identify the effects of opening clauses on job flows. We know, for example, that firm size and industry affiliation have a large impact on job flows (HALTIWANGER et al. 2008, BASSANINI and MARIANNA 2010) , and that these variables also influence the prevalence of opening clauses (KOHAUT and SCHNABEL 2007) . We also recognise that the business outlook and other firm characteristics play an important role. Therefore, we control for observable heterogeneity in covariates and hence use methods of multivariate analysis in the next step.
Econometric Model
Before presenting the results of our econometric analyses, we discuss various methods of estimation. First, we consider a simple estimation via Ordinary Least Squares, controlling for various covariates. Of course, considering the panel format of our dataset, i.e. the fact that each observation (firm) is observed multiple times, a pooled OLS estimator needs to correct for the correlation over time via clustered standard errors. Furthermore, we include time dummies to capture trends or macroeconomic effects (see CAMERON and TRIVEDI 2006, ch. 21) :
A POLS estimator is assumed to be consistent under certain assumptions, such as the absence of a selection bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. Unfortunately, we cannot use panel estimation techniques such as the within group or the between group estimator, because (a) we do not have enough variation over time in the classification of firms into groups with or without opening clauses in the IAW information 12 and (b) we do not have enough observations over time when using only the IAB informa- 13 Hence, we use a different method to control for selection on observable characteristics, namely a matching estimator, as first introduced by ROSEN- BAUM and RUBIN (1983) . We therefore relax the more stringent functional form assumptions of OLS estimation, which do not easily allow parts of the data to be detected where no matches between treated and untreated exist. Traditional matching methods try to compare observations that are 'equal', or at least similar, concerning their characteristics. However, as we use a large number of characteristics, we evade the curse of dimensionality by comparing firms with similar propensity scores, i.e. firms with a similar probability of being in the programme group conditional on observable characteristics.
We compute the propensity scores using a logit model as the conditional probability that a firm applies a CBA with at least one opening clause on working time and compensation (IAW data), knows explicitly about opening clauses, or applies opening clauses (IAB EP data). We control for the panel dimension of our data using clustered standard errors and time dummies. For the correct specification of the selection estimation we employ economic theory, knowledge of institutions, and experience from other empirical studies (e.g. TEIXEIRA 2006 and SCHNABEL et al. 2006 ). We present an overview of all variables used and the selection estimations in Tables A.1, A.3, A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix, displaying various specifications as robustness checks. We find that there is a trade-off between the number of control variables included in the estimation and the number of observations we lose when incorporating more covariates due to item non-response.
14
To assess the quality of our propensity score estimations we use standardised bias tests to compare the means of the covariates between programme and control groups before and after the matching process (ROSENBAUM and RUBIN 1985) . We perform mean tests for all possible specifications and present them for our preferred specifications in terms of the existence of opening clauses in Table A .4 in the Appendix.
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After the matching process, we measure the average treatment effect on the treated observations (ATT), conditional on the respective propensity scores, to identify the effect of opening clauses on job flows:
Tobias Brändle and Wolf Dieter Heinbach
Two observations in time would theoretically enable us to use a difference-in-differences estimator. However, there are severe doubts that the common trend assumption would be violated: see the discussion on the knowledge about the existence of opening clauses.
14 Some researchers advocate intentional overparametrisation of the model to avoid a potential omitted variable bias. This can, however, lead to serious issues when some missing values are not randomly distributed, as, for example, JENSEN and RÄSSLER (2007) point out for sensitive variables such as turnover or the share of intermediates.
These tests are carried out using the Stata command pstest by Leuven and SIANESI (2003) .
The tests include differences in means for all characteristics both before and after the matching process, the percentage bias and its reduction, and t-tests with the null hypothesis stating that the means of the covariates do not differ. They also include mean tests across all characteristics and the reduction in pseudo R 2 .
where
In words: our estimator calculates the mean differences in job flows, Y , between programme group and control group, 16 inside the common support, and weighted by the propensity scores, PðX Þ (see CALIENDO and KOPEINIG 2008) .
In order for this estimator to be unbiased, it is of central importance that the conditional independence assumption (CIA) holds. The CIA states that systematic differences in outcomes between treated and untreated observations are only attributable to treatment once the covariates X have been controlled for: Y 0 ; Y 1 ?djX . We feel assured that the wealth of information in the IAB EP accounts for this assumption. However, matching of firms can always be problematic, because the fact that a firm belongs to the programme group can itself mean that there are effects on that firm's 'neighbours', i.e. competitors in the control group. We acknowledge that the decision of a firm to bargain collectively might have an influence on a neighbouring firm (either inciting it to also bargain collectively or to react in a different manner). However, this is not the case for opening clauses. First, opening clauses do not seem to be that important for firms, as the results of KOHAUT and SCHNABEL (2007) show. Second, opening clauses are limited in magnitude and time (HEINBACH and SCHRÖPFER 2007) and have a much smaller impact on working time and wages than CBAs per se. Third, contrary to a firm's decision to bargain collectively, the decision to introduce opening clauses is effectively made by unions.
17 The union's decision is mainly driven by politics and industry characteristics, for example a sector's vulnerability to shocks and the industry's expected need for flexibility. Hence, we do not expect the existence of opening clauses to have an effect on the counterfactuals, especially not at the firm level. Following the same line of reasoning, firms with different job flow rates will not sort themselves into programme and control groups. As regards a firm's knowledge of the existence of opening clauses, this cannot have an effect on the firm's competitors, because it is not observable by them. It is also not probable that a firm explicitly joins a CBA with or without opening clauses, because the corresponding CBA is determined by a firm's location and industry affiliation. Contrary to this, the decision to apply opening clauses is made by the firm and can be observed by competitors. However, as we know from, for example, HEINBACH and SCHRÖPFER (2007) , firms cannot decide on this matter on their own. They have to consult theunion responsible, the works council, or the staff.
As regards the different possible methods of comparing observations from the programme group and the control group, there exists a trade-off between unbiasedness and efficiency (see CALIENDO and KOPEINIG 2008 Table 2 presents the main results of our empirical estimation of the effects of the existence of opening clauses on job flows. We present the results from the POLS estimation as well as those from the unmatched and matched ATT for each different specification (full details of the POLS estimation for the preferred specification (4) are provided in Table A .2 in the Appendix; tables for all other specifications are available upon request). In specification (1) we use only the variable of interest and year dummy variables. In specifications (2) and (3) we gradually add covariates with only a small share of item non-response. In specifications (4) and (5) we also add sensitive variables such as turnover, shares of investments, and information on employment pacts. In general, we find that the inclusion of additional covariates in the POLS or the selection equation explains a large share of the raw differences in job flows between the firms with and without flexible CBAs. As regards job reallocation rates, we find that by controlling for covariates, the significance of the effect of opening clauses vanishes. This is also the case when using the matching estimator. The same holds true for job creation rates: while the unconditional effect of opening clauses is negative and (partly) significant, its sign reverses and loses significance when covariate effects and selection on observables are taken into account. Turning to job destruction rates, we can see that the strongly significant negative effect diminishes when more control variables are added in the POLS estimation, but stays significant. This is not the case in the ATT estimation, where we do not find a significant effect in specifications (3) to (5). However, when looking at the overall job growth rates, we find significant effects in most specifications. Firms with opening clauses in their CBAs grow by about 0.57 to 0.73 percentage points more, significant at the 10 to 5% level in the POLS estimation and about 0.43 to 0.66 percentage points more in the ATT estimation, albeit not significant in specifications (3) and (5). Therefore, in conclusion we find the existence of opening clauses in a CBA to exert a small and weakly significant positive effect on job growth rates, comprising of non-significantly higher job creation and non-significantly lower job destruction rates. It is therefore important to look at all possible job flow rates to gain an overall understanding of the effect. 
Knowledge and Application of Opening Clauses
Using the additional IAB information in waves 2005 and 2007 we further analyse the notion that firms with explicit knowledge about opening clauses could anticipate their increased flexibility and therefore have higher job creation rates. As stated above, the information on knowledge is probably biased towards firms that need to apply opening clauses, and therefore not very reliable. Hence, the results need to be interpreted with care. We display the results for our variables of interest in Table 3 , while the full models of the POLS estimation are available upon request. We can see that firms with explicit knowledge of opening clauses do not have significantly different job flow rates once covariates and selection on observables have been controlled for. These results Opening Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements 171 indicate that explicit knowledge of opening clauses does not affect firms' job flow rates. Our hypothesis that firms anticipate their increased flexibility and therefore increase hiring cannot be supported. Either these firms already have enough flexibility -for example, because they pay wages above the bargained wage -or they do not gain more flexibility from opening clauses because they could be forced to apply them instantly. With regard to firms applying opening clauses, we further analyse whether these firms differ in their job flow rates from firms not applying them, using the IAB EP information. 19 As there are only few observations and the information used is depen- -
------------
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It must not be forgotten that applying opening clauses is usually only allowed when a firm is in a bad economic situation. Taken in isolation, such a negative situation is associated dent on the fact that firms know if an opening clause exists, the results should be interpreted with care. Compared with our previous estimation, we do not find significant effects either, as Table 4 shows (the full POLS models are available upon request). Controlling once again for covariates and selection on observables effectively reduces the (already small) differences found in the descriptive statistics. We canther- -
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with negative job growth and may therefore cause negative selection of these firms that apply opening clauses. While we control for this in the selection estimation within our main estimation via a dummy variable for a bad economic situation, we also run a separate regression comparing only firms with an equally bad economic situation in our robustness checks section. The results do not change.
efore conclude that applying opening clauses does not have any effect on job growth. As we know from HEINBACH and SCHRÖPFER (2007) , the application of opening clauses in a firm is negotiated with the works council, the staff, or theresponsible union. We also know from HÜBLER (2005) that employment pacts, which are also negotiated at the firm level, often restrict the laying-off of employees. It could be the case that the application of opening clauses is also bound to restrictions we cannot observe, such that the application of opening clauses cannot affect employment directly. Unfortunately, the present data does not allow us to investigate this question further.
Our results show that controlling for covariates and selection on observables is very important when exploring the link between opening clauses and job flow rates. In our POLS estimation, we can identify partly significantly positive effects of the existence of opening clauses on job growth rates, which are in line with our hypotheses and the main policy objective of opening clauses. We do not find an anticipation effect if firms explicitly know of opening clauses. In addition, the application of opening clauses also has no additional significant effects on job flow rates.
Robustness Checks
In order to ensure the robustness of our results, we use different subsamples, i.e., we exclude large firms (with more than 200 employees). We also match firms based on their (two-digit) industry affiliation, their firm size class, and a corresponding business outlook, because these covariates have been shown to be important factors influencing job flow rates. We find our estimates to be robust against these alterations. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the propensity scores. There is a wide range of common support for all variables. There are very few programme observations outside the common support, which also holds across the various specifications of the selection model. As there are parts of the propensity score distribution with relatively few programme or control observations, we check the sensitivity of our results in this respect. We estimate the propensity scores in subsamples where observations with probably very large propensity scores (such as large firms) are excluded. This does not significantly change our results. We also vary the matching algorithm, using nearest neighbour and calliper matching, both with and without replacement. Additionally, we re-estimate our results using the sampling weights of the IAB EP and find them to be robust against these alterations.
Conclusion
In this paper we study the relationship between opening clauses in collective bargaining agreements and job flows in West German manufacturing firms. We are interested in whether opening clauses can be linked to higher job creation and lower job destruction rates as a result of increased flexibility for collectively covered firms, and to higher overall job growth rates. After laying out theoretical considerations on how opening clauses could influence job flow rates, we explain the institutional setting in Germany, particularly the legal foundations of opening clauses. We illustrate the importance of adding supplementary information on opening clauses. We find that opening clauses are widespread, but also that there is still an information problem on the firm side.
Our empirical results are partly in line with the theoretical assumptions. The existence of opening clauses can be linked to higher job growth rates, but this relationship is small and not very robust across specifications. Firms with flexible CBAs have, on average, 0.50 to 0.70 percentage points higher job growth rates than firms with inflexible CBAs. The empirical analyses fail, however, in identifying a clear channel through which opening clauses exert this positive effect on employment. First, neitherjob destruction nor job creation rates are significantly different between covered firms with and without opening clauses. The signs, however, point in the right direction (smaller job destruction and larger job creation rates). Second, an attempt to explain our results using information on the explicit knowledge about opening clauses or their actual application does not show any significant results. However, this effect can be partly explained by the recent empirical literature stressing an anticipationor threat effect of opening clauses rather than an actual effect of application (ELLGUTH et al. 2012, GARLOFF and GÜRTZGEN 2012) , and by poor data quality. 20 Methodologically, we draw several conclusions from our research. First, differences in the descriptive statistics only partly reflect the results of our multivariate analyses. This is especially the case for the explicit knowledge and the application of opening clauses. In this case, after controlling for covariates, the effects of the variables of interest completely change, i.e. disappear. This is not so much the case for the existence of opening clauses, where the differences in job flows between covered firms with and without opening clauses are usually smaller in the multivariate analyses as compared to the descriptive statistics, but are not completely reduced to zero. Second, we only see small differences between the two different estimation methods in our multivariate analyses. These differences, however, often determine the statistical significance of our results, as the coefficients are quite small and the quantity of data only allows for a medium degree of statistical power.
Our research contributes to the literature on labour market institutions and job flows. We conclude that it is important to recognise that the German system of industrial relations has changed during recent years, such that it provides firms with flexibility through many different measures. While our research shows only partly that opening clauses can be an effective tool for reducing job destruction and increasing job growth rates, it is probably the combined existence of various measures of flexibility such as opening clauses, company-level pacts for employment, short-time work, and temporary agency work that explains the recent positive development in the German labour market, but not each one on it's own. Further research should therefore look at the interaction and the combined effects of these new institutions.
As regards opening clauses per se, our research carefully suggests that an economic policy with the objective of maximising employment should promote them and that firms should be made more aware of their existence. Employees would benefit from such a policy as long as they prefer wage cuts over unemployment to a certain degree. 21 The majority of trade unions, until now, oppose the expansion of flexibility measures in CBAs, because they fear a loss of influence with respect to bargaining power. However, according to our research, this development is going to deteriorate the union's member base over time, as covered firms without such flexible measures grow more slowly. Therefore, even trade unions should favour such a policy, if they credibly want to demonstrate that they do not only protect the rents of insiders. 6. Appendix 
